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The role of public actors in construction logistics: effects on and of
relational interfaces
Victor Erikssona, Kajsa Hulthena, Viktoria Sundquista, Anna Fredrikssonb and Mats Janneb
aDepartment of Technology Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Goteborg, Sweden; bDepartment of
Science and Technology, Link€oping University, Link€oping, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Public actors are increasingly enforcing the use of specifically designed construction logistics
setups (CLS) to cope with logistical challenges and minimising disturbances on third parties in
large construction projects. The organising of these CLS is contingent on the interaction among
several types of actors. The purpose of the paper is to advance the understanding of the design
and use of CLS and the distribution of various outcomes of such arrangements on the actors
involved. The paper analyses the role of public actors in the initiating of CLS and how this
affects the relational interfaces in the CLS triad of developers, contractors and logistics service
providers, and the outcomes of their interactions. First, the main reason for a public actor to ini-
tiate a CLS is not cost, productivity or innovativity gains, but to decrease disturbances on third
parties. Second, developers and contractors are forced to use the CLS initiated by the public
actor. This makes them take on a forced customer role, explaining why these actors are often
resistant to adopt to a certain CLS. Third, ripple effects, such as unintended costs and productiv-
ity impacts, occur in the construction supply chain because of the use of CLS.
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Construction projects are typically material intensive
and generate large amounts of transports to and from
sites (Josephson and Saukkoriipi 2007, Dubois et al.
2019). Construction logistics management should
hence be a key concern in the construction industry.
However, lack of logistics management has been iden-
tified as a main reason for low productivity and pro-
ject cost overruns in the construction industry
(Agapiou et al. 1998, Vrijhoef and Koskela 2000,
Sundquist et al. 2018). Studies show that well-planned
construction logistics can reduce total construction
costs with as much as 20% (L€ofgren 2010, Linden and
Josephson 2013). Furthermore, construction in urban
areas adds to the logistics management complexity
due to lack of space and disturbances on the sur-
rounding society and the transport system
(Kooragamage 2015). This, in turn, calls for sophisti-
cated logistics management not only focussing on the
site itself, but also on coordination of transports to
and from sites to decrease congestion, noise,
accidents, and emissions in urban areas (Janne and
Fredriksson 2019).
Construction logistics can be organised in various
ways with different scopes of planning and coordin-
ation (Dubois et al. 2019). Efforts to improve the plan-
ning and coordination of construction logistics have
led to the appearance of so-called construction logis-
tics setups (CLS) (Fredriksson et al. 2021). A CLS
describes the way construction logistics is organised in
a project including a bundle of combined services that
manages and coordinates the flow of materials and
resources to, from, and on the construction site
(Fredriksson et al. 2021). The use of CLS in large con-
struction projects is increasingly initiated by public
actors. Due to the contemporary expansion in CLS util-
isation, there is a need to further scrutinise the role of
public actors and how the CLS design (what services
are included and how actors are connected) affects
the operational outcomes for the different actors
involved, including the various gains and obstacles
when operating in a CLS setting. The organising of
CLS in construction projects is contingent on the
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interaction among actors representing developers
(public and private), contractors, and logistics service
providers (LSP) that form what we refer to as the con-
struction logistics setup triad (CLS triad). The CLS triad
is contingent on several types of interorganizational
interfaces with various contents between the involved
actors. With point of departure in the CLS triad, the
involved relationships between these actors are scruti-
nised by applying a framework of relational interfaces
(Araujo et al. 1999) in order to investigate how the
structure and function of these relational interfaces
affect the organising of a CLS and its outcomes. The
paper is based on two case studies, involving two dif-
ferent public actors (public developers in the form of
a regional council and an exploitation organisation)
that initiate differently designed CLS, one used in the
construction and renovation of a hospital and one
used in a large city development project.
The purpose of the paper is to advance the under-
standing of the design and use of CLS and the distri-
bution of various outcomes of such arrangements on
the actors involved. To accomplish this, the paper
analyses the role of public actors in the initiating of
CLS and how this affects the relational interfaces in
the CLS triad of developers (public and private), con-
tractors and LSP, and the outcomes of their interac-
tions. This altogether can explain the motivation for,
but also resistance towards, implementing CLS. The
study thus targets the intricate issue of, at the one
hand, the perceived need and value of a CLS, and at
the other hand, the fact that a CLS often clashes with
a common view in the construction industry of the
obligations and behaviours of a certain type of actor
in a construction project, such as contractor, devel-
oper, and LSP.
The paper is organised as follows. First, the theoret-
ical foundation on which the paper rests is introduced.
Second, a problem discussion and research questions
are elaborated on. Third, the underlying methodology
is presented. Fourth, two cases are introduced and
analysed. The paper ends with a discussion on the
theoretical contributions, a conclusions section, and a
section on future research.
Theoretical foundation
This section first introduces the CLS concept followed
by a discussion of the CLS triad. Finally, the relational
interface framework by Araujo et al. (1999) used as a
basis for analysis is elaborated upon.
Construction logistics setups (CLS)
A CLS can be organised as asset-based terminal serv-
ices, e.g. a construction logistics centre (CLC), or a
non-asset-based service, e.g. a checkpoint service
(Hamzeh et al. 2007, Janne and Fredriksson 2019). The
aim of a CLC is goods consolidation to reduce the
number of deliveries to the construction site as to
cope with challenging traffic and congestion situations
(Lundesj€o 2015, Janne and Fredriksson 2019).
Checkpoints, in turn, have emerged as a way to secure
just-in-time (JIT) deliveries with booked timeslots for
deliveries and specifications of delivery information,
e.g. material and vehicle types, goods volumes, and
handling equipment requirements (Akintoye 1995,
Voordijk 2000, Sundquist et al. 2018).
Furthermore, a CLS often includes various value
adding services (Fredriksson et al. 2021), such as;
coordination of supplies to the site through strict rules
and a booking system (Dubois et al. 2019), logistics-
based site plans (Josephson and Saukkoriipi 2007,
Transport for London 2013), site coordination
(Transport for London 2013, Ekesk€ar and Rudberg
2016, Sundquist et al. 2018), materials handling on-
and off-site (Linden and Josephson 2013, Ekesk€ar and
Rudberg 2016) and waste management (Behera et al.
2015, Janne and Fredriksson 2019). These services aim
to improve on-site logistics (Linden and Josephson
2013, Ekesk€ar and Rudberg 2016, Spillane and Oyedele
2017) and/or off-site logistics when coordinating trans-
port to and from sites of the fragmented operations in
construction (Thunberg and Persson 2014, Thunberg
and Fredriksson 2018, Ying et al. 2018) .
A CLS can be initiated by public or private actors,
such as local municipalities, public and private devel-
opers or contractors, that all have different goals with
the CLS (Fredriksson et al. 2021). The contractor faces
the challenge of managing a network of supply chains
delivering different materials, products, and other
resources to construction projects (Lundesj€o 2015). For
the contractor, the responsibility for planning and
coordinating the supply chain and the construction
site therefore becomes a main issue (Azambuja and
O’Brien 2009). Consequently, contractors increasingly
initiate CLS to streamline the on-site logistics proc-
esses (Kooragamage 2015) and/or to coordinate logis-
tics processes across multiple projects (Lundesj€o
2015). In comparison, the public actors focus on the
need to coordinate construction traffic as a part of the
overall traffic in a city to maintain good relationships
with residents and businesses in terms of accessibility
and mobility (Goldman and Gorham 2006). Depending
on the purpose of introducing a CLS, the CLS can be
2 V. ERIKSSON ET AL.
more or less suitable to fulfil this purpose. Fredriksson
et al. (2021) find that being aware of the goals and
challenges to be managed is a good starting point
when developing a CLS. This means starting in what
actually needs to be managed rather than from what
is technologically possible which, according to Chakkol
et al. (2018), is often the case.
In most cases, the CLS is operated by an LSP taking
the responsibility for performing logistics services dur-
ing the duration of the project (Dubois et al. 2019,
Janne and Fredriksson 2019). Furthermore, in some
cases the LSP also takes on the role as systems
designer by establishing the rules of conduct and
what services to include in the CLS (Sundquist et al.
2018, Fredriksson et al. 2021). The more encompassing
the role of the LSP, the more complex the involved
business relationships will be (Fredriksson et al. 2021),
meaning that there is a need to clearly stipulate how
to govern these business relationship (Janne 2020).
Depending on how the CLS is organised the nature
of the contractual relationships may vary (Ekesk€ar et
al. 2019, Janne and Fredriksson 2019). There are exam-
ples of projects with several contractual relationships
between all involved actors (Janne and Fredriksson
2019) or more simple and linear contractual agree-
ments between the LSP and the main contractor, and
the main contractor and subcontractors (Janne and
Rudberg 2020). The interactions between the actors
can be of a partner type relationship or even a peer-
to-peer relationship where services are exchanged and
resources shared, for example, between multiple main
contractors and between contractors and LSP (Ekesk€ar
et al. 2019). Norrman and Henkow (2014) highlight
that traditional contracts and regulations may not be
suitable for partner-based relationships where respon-
sibilities are divided. These relationships can, however,
still be contractually governed but are often less strict
(Ekesk€ar et al. 2019). In these cases, control mecha-
nisms can be informal and based on trust, commit-
ment, and information exchange (Caldwell et al. 2009).
Previous research indicates that relationships based on
traditional contracts focus on costs and efficiency
gains (Janne and Fredriksson 2019), whereas the part-
ner-based contracts foster innovation and service
development (Hedborg Bengtsson et al. 2018).
One challenge regarding CLS is that the initiator of
the CLS is not necessarily the actor that is most
affected by it (Janne and Fredriksson 2019). A CLS ini-
tiated by a contractor is more of a traditional third-
party logistics setup (Marasco 2008, Fredriksson et al.
2021) where the LSP takes on the role as the supplier
of the CLS and the contractor is the customer of the
CLS. In a CLS initiated by a public actor, this is not
always the case (Fredriksson et al. 2021). Instead, in
this case, the public actor is the customer of the CLS,
but contractors can be the ones who operationally are
affected by the CLS and the ones that to a large
extent finance the CLS through service fees, making
the contractors de facto customers of the CLS (Ekesk€ar
and Rudberg 2016, Janne and Fredriksson 2019).
Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain who the pri-
mary customer of the CLS is (Janne and
Fredriksson 2019).
The construction logistics setup triad (CLS triad)
Firms increasingly adopt a service-based business
model to provide various service setups, such as CLS,
which have increased the adoption of service triads
(Bastl et al. 2019). Investigations of triads have been
suggested to better understand the importance and
effects of service provision in general (Wynstra et al.
2015) and with regard to transport- and logistics serv-
ices specifically (Andersson et al. 2019).
A triadic approach is advocated in Andersson et al.
(2019), that identify the transport service triad (TST) as
a way to capture the connection between the
exchange of goods between a buyer and seller of
goods and the exchange of transport services
between the buyer of transport services (either the
buyer or seller of goods) and the seller of transport
services. This construct is used in a construction indus-
try setting in Eriksson (2019) where such a triad,
involving a wholesaler (seller of goods and buyer of
transport services), a construction firm (buyer of
goods) and a transport service provider (seller of trans-
port services) was scrutinised regarding the character
of each of the involved business relationships and the
interconnectedness among these business relation-
ships. The analysis shows that a TST provides an
extended analytical scope of transport efficiency com-
pared to a firm or dyadic scope of analysis.
Furthermore, it is shown how the efforts of improving
(transport) efficiency from one of the involved actors’
perspective might clash with other actors’ views on
transport efficiency but also other types of efficiency.
The study concludes that interaction among the firms
in the TST, enabling adjustments and adaptations of
activities and resources between firms, is imperative to
manage these issues.
Therefore, one way to analyse the actors’ relation-
ships and how they are affected by the CLS is by tak-
ing a triadic approach owing to the complexities of
logistics service provision in construction. As such, the
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 3
three actors involved in the CLS triad, as depicted in
Figure 1 below, are all involved in and affected by the
CLS, and also, the triad is embedded in a wider net-
work due to the many connections each actor has to
other actors beyond the triad.
Most studies on service triads take a one actor’s
perspective (Li and Choi 2009, Sengupta et al. 2018).
However, central for the exploration of the CLS triad
as a service triad is the interpretation of the relation-
ships that connect the actors and also, the perspec-
tives of all three actors involved in the CLS. Although
their roles may differ depending on the specific pro-
ject, the actors in the CLS triad are interdependent.
Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 1, each such triad
is embedded in a business network which it affects
and is affected by.
Relational interfaces
The effects of various forms of interaction taking place
in a CLS triad in the context of the design and oper-
ation of a CLS are scrutinised by utilising a framework
developed by Araujo et al. (1999). The framework is
based on and has been applied in industrial contexts
with very clear roles regarding the supplier-customer
interaction (e.g. Araujo et al. 2016, Andersen and
Gadde 2019, Sundquist and Melander 2020) and identi-
fies four types of relational (customer-supplier) interfa-
ces based on how customers and suppliers relate their
resources to each other. The point of departure is that
firms are dependent on the resources controlled by
others, and customers get access to resources con-
trolled by suppliers by their supplier relationships.
The framework distinguishes between four types of
interfaces: the standardised interface, the specified
interface, the translational interface, and the inter-
active interface. The standardised interface occurs
when neither the supplier nor the customer needs to
be aware of each other’s contexts. In this situation
what is exchanged, or provided, between the parties
can be managed by a standardised interaction. The
specified interface appears when the customer wants a
customised solution and therefore specifies in detail
how the solution should be the designed and realised.
The translational interface occurs when the customer
instead specifies a function rather than the solution
itself. This means that the supplier has more freedom
to decide what resources are appropriate to use and
how they should be utilised as long as the solution
fulfils the customer’s needs and its own logic regard-
ing resource use. In this interface the supplier needs
to translate the functional demands from the cus-
tomer into a solution that is in line with the expecta-
tions of the customer. The interactive interface
illustrates the case when the supplier and customer
jointly, in interaction, develop the specifications of the
solution together so that both the context of the sup-
plier and the context of the customer could be taken
into consideration when deciding on which resources
to be used and how.
Depending on which type of interface is in play,
the firms are provided with various opportunities and
also, various impacts in terms of outcomes and pre-
requisites for the relationships among the firms.
Araujo et al. (1999) identify that the various interfaces
differ in terms of (1) the costs associated with the use
of the respective interface and, (2) the benefits pro-
vided by them differ in terms of (a) productivity and
(b) innovativity from the perspective of the customer.
Problem discussion and research questions
Li and Choi (2009) argue that a lack of understanding
of triadic relationships and their dynamics is the root
for failure in many service situations and further
research is needed on how service triads are organised
and managed (Bastl et al. 2019). In line with this, logis-
tics research has been criticised for not explicating the
mediating roles and implications of indirect relation-
ships inherent in third-party logistics (TPL) situations
(Selviaridis and Spring 2007). Bastl et al. (2019) specif-
ically point to that service contracts impact on how
the service triad is coordinated and controlled; and
that the responsibility lies not with one actor but at
least two actors.
The framework by Araujo et al. (1999) has earlier
been applied primarily in the context of dyads focus-
sing on private actors. From the literature presented
above, it is evident that CLS involve different actors
Figure 1. The construction logistics setup triad embedded in
the wider network.
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with different goals and challenges and that the actor
roles in the CLS triad in terms of customers or suppli-
ers are not straightforward. In the CLS triad, the LSP is
always the supplier of the CLS. However, the customer
role is more complex and needs to be understood in
its CLS triad context, especially in the case where
there is a public initiator. In line with this, RQ1 reads:
What types of relational interfaces in a CLS triad
can be identified in the organising of a CLS?
Fredriksson et al. (2021) show that when initiated
by a public actor the purpose of the CLS becomes
blurred and the different actors have various purposes
that can also inflict with each other. There is a need
to understand how the purposes of the different
actors in the CLS triad impact the organisation of a
CLS. What is the difference between the initiator and
user roles of the actors in the CLS triad and between
the formal customer(s) in the business exchange in
the CLS and the actual user of the services provided
in the CLS? Furthermore, the Araujo et al. (1999)
framework takes the perspective of the customer as
point of departure for analysis of (1) the costs associ-
ated with the use of the respective interface and, (2)
the benefits provided by the interfaces in terms of (a)
productivity and (b) innovativity. In line with this,
RQ2 reads:
What implications do different types of relational
interfaces in the CLS triad have as a consequence for
cost, productivity and innovativity of the organising of
the CLS?
Previous research on triads in the transport and
logistics context show that there are implications of
how the triad is organised on the wider business net-
work (Eriksson, 2019). The CLS actors also bring about
involvement of a number of other actors such as sub-
contractors, materials suppliers and transport service
providers etc. (Seth et al. 2018). Thus, the contents of
the relational interfaces within the CLS triad affect and
are affected by the operations of the CLS; the actors
involved in the CLS triad but also, by actors in the
wider business network in which the CLS triad is
embedded. In line with this, RQ3 reads:
How are other actors in the wider network beyond
the CLS triad affected by the organising of the CLS?
Method
Research from two research groups is combined where
one research group consisting of three people has car-
ried out three research projects over a period of seven
years. The second research group consisting of two peo-
ple has carried out research over a period of five years
as part of five research projects. In total 20 different CLS
in Sweden, Denmark and Finland have been studied.
Based on these cases, the research groups identified
that the phenomenon in this paper, the role of public
developers in the formation of CLS triads, needed more
attention. Two of the cases were selected based on the
fact that they had been studied by both groups over a
time period of at least five years and that they provided
good illustrations of how public actors take on a more
or less active role in CLS triads when organising CLS.
The projects are long term (25 and 8 years time span)
and complex from an organisational point of view, with
many construction sites at the same time within the
project area, and both have a central urban location
with few available transport roads.
The first case, henceforth referred to as ‘The hos-
pital project’, describes a situation where a regional
council decides on a CLS based on a checkpoint in
the re-construction and new build of a hospital. The
second case, henceforth referred to as ‘The city devel-
opment project’, illustrates a situation where a public
exploitation organisation requires a CLS based on a
construction consolidation centre in a large city devel-
opment project. The two case-studies provide different
perspectives on the role of public actors when initiat-
ing the use of CLS. Both are seen as public developers
as they are responsible for the development, in the
first case of a hospital, and in the second case as land-
owners in a city development area, where they also
develop land for the city’s own use. These two public
actors are more or less active in the governing of a
CLS and the cases also illustrate the role of contextual
factors, such as how formal agreements are utilised.
For example, in Figure 2 the LSP and the public devel-
oper have a translational interface, whereas in
Figure 3 the LSP and the public developer have an
interactive interface. Thus the two cases contribute to
the understanding of two different settings regarding
Figure 2. Identified interfaces in the hospital project.
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control and access to resources, which, in turn, creates
various possibilities and challenges in the CLS triad.
Table 1 below summarises the features of the con-
struction projects in the two cases, executed as two
different CLS triads in the paper.
The data collection involved interviews, observa-
tions, and a large amount of secondary data. In total,
53 interviews have been conducted with representa-
tives from LSPs, main contractors, subcontractors,
developers, municipalities, material manufacturers, dis-
tributors and transport firms (see Table 2).
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted
from 1 to 2 hours. The interviews were conducted by
the researchers and were recorded and transcribed.
Besides general background information about the
role of the interviewee, three main areas were covered
in the data collection: (1) planning and execution of
the CLS, including how their services relate to other
operations; (2) the specific project; and (3) the inter-
action, information exchange and governance mecha-
nisms amongst various actors on- and off the
construction site, within the triad and in the wider
network. There were also questions about the CLS in
the specific projects, experiences from logistics in
other construction projects and the actors’ operations
in general. Site visits enabled observations of the CLS
and the related operations. Specifically, unloading
from vehicles, site transport and logistics, delivery con-
trol and planning of resource utilisation were studied.
Visits at distributors and material manufacturers
provided insights into activities such as manufacturing,
storage, packaging and transport. Secondary data in
the form of site disposition plans, tenders, materials
handling directives and information from delivery
planning systems were crucial to understand the func-
tion of CLS and its effects for various actors.
The research method is based on an abductive
logic in line with systematic combining as empirical
data and theory were systematically combined in an
iterative process (Dubois and Gadde 2002). For
example, the intention from the beginning was to
cover more general aspects in the actor interaction in
the two cases. However, as the data revealed interest-
ing aspects of the interaction between developers,
contractors and LSPs in the design and use of CLS,
this analytical focus emerged during the process. The
developer role of the public actors in the cases was
found especially interesting since it showed to have
great impact on the outcomes of CLS. To analytically
approach this issue, theory of triads and the identifica-
tion of three generic actor roles (public/private devel-
opers, contractors and LSPs) and the relational
interface framework by Araujo et al. (1999) were suc-
cessively identified and used. The analysis of data
started with the identification of the actors in the two
CLS triads, including the connections among actors in
the respective triad, and central connections between
the respective triads and its surrounding network. This
mapping was possible through the combining of data
from the interviews, site visits and secondary data.
Each connection, now labelled relation interface, was
then classified by using the framework. The result of
this analytical process is illustrated in Figure 2 (the
CLS triad in the hospital project) and Figure 3 (the CLS
triad in the city development project). Finally, out-
comes in the form of costs, productivity and innovativ-
ity were identified as effects of the identified
interfaces (see Table 3). The research process has thus
been a nonlinear, path-dependent process with the
objective of matching theory and the empirical world
(Dubois and Gadde 2002). Accordingly, during the
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Figure 3. Identified interfaces in the city development project.
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research process, the cases developed into illustrations
of relational interfaces in CLS triads and the various
roles of public developers in such triads. The data
from the case studies enabled the capturing of the
phenomenon of how the three generic actors (con-
tractor, LSP and public/private developer), in a CLS
triad affect and are affected by the organising of a
CLS. Furthermore, the in-depth data from the case
studies in terms of actor interaction was considered
critical to understanding the dynamics of the business
context (Halinen and T€ornroos 2005). In line with
Dubois and Gadde (2002), this paper relies on analyt-
ical generalisation rather than statistical generalisation.
The above description of the abductive nature of the
research process aims to show how credibility has
been accomplished in this study.
Two cases of construction logistics service
triads (CLS triads)
In this section, first, the hospital project is presented,
followed by the city development project.
The CLS triad in the hospital project
In this case the public developer in the form of a
county council tendered a contractor for the re-con-
struction and new build of a hospital. In the tendering
process the developer specifically pointed to the intri-
cate issue of construction logistics as the hospital
would be fully operational during the construction
process. The contractor had to assure that by no
means would hospital operations be jeopardised, and
the organising of construction logistics had to take
into account the large amount of health care person-
nel, patients and visitors in transfer on the hospital
area. In particular, as the construction gate would be
located next door to the ambulance entrance, the
monitoring of construction transport was crucial.
Additionally, lack of space on the construction site
would only allow one vehicle to be on site at a time,
and vehicles could not wait outside the gate. When
the contractor presented its own internal setup in
terms of how to organise construction logistics, the
developer figured that it was not sophisticated
enough and that the risks in relation to the critical
logistics had been overlooked. Therefore, the devel-
oper decided that the contractor had to use an exter-
nal LSP that was going to be responsible for the CLS,
whereas the contractor would be responsible for pro-
duction. The developer assigned the contractor to ten-
der the LSP selected by the developer. Thus, in this
arrangement the contractor “lost” an important part of
what they usually had included in their contract with
the developer, the on-site logistics. Furthermore, the
contractor could not decide which LSP to use and
what services to be included.
The LSP has developed a portfolio of logistics serv-
ices based on many years of experiences from various
logistics setups in different construction contexts and
projects. The services are standardised and benefit
from specialisation in terms of economies of scale in
on-site logistics operations. However, the combination
of various services is adapted to unique customer
needs and the specific conditions in each project. In
this specific case the CLS involved a checkpoint run
by personnel from the LSP stationed at the site. The
LSP took care of the coordination and monitoring of
all deliveries to the site with their web-based delivery
planning system, including updates of on-site dispos-
ition plans. The LSP also carried out all materials han-
dling, including unloading of materials, quality control
Table 2. Interviews in the study.
Companies
Number of interviews and function of
interviewee
The hospital project LSP – site staff 8 (2 logistics managers, 2 logistics coordinators,
1 material delivery planner, 1 work manager,
1 arrival controller, 1 quality manager)
LSP – central management 6 (2 business developers, 2 logistics consultants,
2 materials handling managers)
Four contractors 4 (3 site managers, 1 work manager)
Two subcontractors 2 (2 work managers)
Two distributors 3 (1 logistics manager, 1 store manager,
1 sales manager)
Transportation firm 2 (1 transport leader, 1 chauffeur)
Management consultancy firm 1 (1 project manager)
Materials manufacturer 1 (1 sales manager)
Project management firm 1 (1 project manager)
The city development project Municipality 4 (1 development area manager)
LSP 9 (4 CLS managers, 2 logistics coordinators,
1 arrival controller)
Four contractors 4 (3 site managers, 2 logistics coordinators)
Eight developers/clients 8 (8 project managers)
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Table 3. Interfaces in the CLS triad and their effects on costs, productivity and innovativity.
Interface type Costs Productivity Innovativity
The hospital project Developer - Contractor:
translational interface (a)
None (no contract for
logistics services)
None (no contract for
logistics services)
Loss of opportunity for the




No costs for the developer,
no costs for the LSP
On site: Increased
productivity due to LSP’s














to the requirements from
the developer regarding
use of the CLS
None as contractors must



















Costs for suppliers due to






None: suppliers must adapt
to the contractors’
requirements
The city development project City of Stockholm – LSP:
interactive interface (f)
None as the City of
Stockholm does not pay
for operation of the CLS
On site: Potential increase
of productivity
Off site: potential increase
in productivity in regard
to transports to site




Put focus upon logistics
from the beginning of
projects
The LSP perceives hinders
for continuous
improvements over time
when the CLS is
operationalised.
City of Stockholm -
Developers:
specified interface (g)
Costs for the CLS paid by
developers in
land allocation
None None: developers must
adapt to the










Costs for the CLS enforced
on the contractors.
On site: Potential increase
of productivity of
contractors if adaptations
to the requirements from
the developer regarding










expected for LSP: sell












The possibility of storing
and calling off materials













Costs for suppliers due to




None: suppliers must adapt
to the contractors’
requirements
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and transport of materials to the correct installation
area at the site. All deliveries to the site had to be
booked by contractors in the system at least five days
in advance and deliveries were scheduled according
to time slots of 30minutes. All deliveries had to pass
through the checkpoint located a few minutes from
the construction site and obtain approval to proceed
to the onloading area at site. Contractors paid a fixed
fee per unit of materials handled by the LSP, and
goods should preferably be delivered on pallets to be
transported by pallet lifts into construction elevators
at the site. All materials handling took place after
regular working hours between 4 pm and midnight by
the LSP’s personnel as to minimise disturbance in the
transport of on-site personnel by elevators during day-
time and hampering other logistics flows of transports
and people in close proximity to the site. Logistics effi-
ciency is thus improved on site by using the CLS by
the LSP.
All contractors on site had to follow the logistics
setup provided by the LSP. However, these require-
ments were not taken into consideration in every ten-
dering process. As a consequence, contractors who
did not take the delivery fee into account in their ten-
ders for the contract had to ‘pay twice’ for materials
handling: to the LSP and to cover for the hours of
construction workers who normally carry out materials
handling as part of union agreements. Thus, although
contractors now performed ‘only’ production activities
on site, it was difficult to make use of the extra hours
gained from not being involved in materials handling
in an efficient way. In some cases, transport after regu-
lar working hours also entailed extra costs for the con-
tractors. Furthermore, suppliers had to adapt their off-
site operations to be able to deliver off-working hours
and also to follow the strict packaging instructions
enforced by the LSP. An intermediate storage had to
be established by some contractors to be able to cope
with the challenging just-in-time (JIT)-delivery prereq-
uisites at the site since no materials was allowed to be
stored on site due to lack of space. The extra inter-
mediate storage came with an extra cost for these
contractors.
All in all, the enforced situation where the main
contractor had to tender the LSP and its CLS by the
requirements from the developer created tensions
between the main contractor and the LSP. This also
applies to the relations between the LSP and many of
the subcontractors. However, as the project pro-
gressed the interaction among the actors improved as
the contractors learned to adapt planning and execu-
tion of its operations in accordance with the CLS. Also,
several contractors stated that it would have been
impossible to have efficient construction on site with-
out the CLS as the logistics challenges were severe
including the extensive need for coordination of logis-
tics in relation to the many actors present on the site.
Due to the use of a checkpoint, no disturbances
occurred in the hospital area regarding flows of hos-
pital supplies and other traffic. However, in close prox-
imity to the site, vehicles waiting for access to the
checkpoint created disturbances in traffic as they
occupied road service areas and roadsides.
The CLS triad in the city development project
In this case the public developer, in the form of a
publicly owned and controlled exploitation organisa-
tion, had specified several logistics requirements in
relation to a development program where an old
industrial area was going to be transformed into a
new city area. In this area, the exploitation organisa-
tion developed parts themselves and sold other parts
to different private and other public developers.
Therefore, the development program involved many
projects with many different actors. The public devel-
oper initiated the development of a CLS to reduce the
amount of construction traffic in the construction area
as well as to contribute to sustainable transport by
reducing the construction traffic to the construction
area. The developers in each project were forced to
join and commit to the CLS if they wanted to buy
land and be part of the development program. Hence,
the use of the CLS was mandatory for all contractors
acting within the area and they were governed
through contractual agreements between the public
developer, LSP, private developers and contractors. It
was stipulated in the land allocation agreements that
all developers were required to inform their contrac-
tors of the CLS, and the mandatory use of some basic
services offered in the CLS.
For the operating of the CLS the public developer
tendered an LSP that they had experience of from a
previous city development project. The public devel-
oper could thus specify requirements in terms of a
customised setup adapted to the location and site
conditions, based on their knowledge of the services
of the LSP. The CLS comprised of a construction logis-
tics centre (CLC) in the form of a terminal and add-
itional logistics services such as, traffic piloting,
education, perimeter fencing, and security. Each sub-
project had its own unloading zone. The rules of con-
duct of the CLS were developed jointly between the
public developer and the LSP. Accordingly, all
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incoming transports had to be booked into a transport
booking system five days in advance, and no materials
storage on-site was allowed. Instead,
intermediate storage in the terminal would cover for
some short-term storage. There was a common waste
disposal system with smaller waste containers on-site
which were collected by a sub-supplier to the LSP. In
addition there was a common perimeter fencing with
gates, provided by another sub-supplier to the LSP. All
material deliveries under a certain volume had to be
consolidated and vehicles longer than 12 m had to
have a special permit to enter the construction sites.
Except for following these rules, it was possible for
each contractor or developer to set the rules on their
sites and what additional services to buy from the
LSP. As a result, the LSP had to adapt its way of work-
ing and how to make use of its resources in a way
that fulfilled the specified demands of the various
developers. The cost for the CLS was covered by a fee
in relation to the land allotment and by contractors
and subcontractors paying for the logistics services.
The contractors had frequent (at least weekly) con-
tact with the LSP as they were responsible for the
development area coordination and booked all deliv-
eries and use of machinery through a booking calen-
dar. There was an extensive follow up on the use of
the services and costs by the public developer, which
were thereafter feedbacked to the developer and the
contractors. All in all, some positive effects were iden-
tified, and several contractors admit that it would
have been impossible to work in the area without the
CLS due to the many simultaneous operations in the
many projects. The main challenge with the CLS was
to convince and ‘sell’ the idea to all parties. The public
developer was convinced that the CLS would bring
cost savings to the contractors. However, since the
CLS was organised mainly to reduce disturbances, the
cost and productivity gains of contractors did not
come out as planned. Only a few contractors bought
additional services besides the mandatory basic serv-
ices. Furthermore, developers viewed the developer-
contractor information exchange as troublesome.
Analysis
The analysis is based on three themes in relation to
the research questions: (i) characteristics of interfaces
in the CLS triad, (ii) implications of various interfaces
for the actors involved in the CLS, and (iii) the CLS
triad as embedded in the wider network.
Characteristics of interfaces
The section starts with an analysis of the the hospital
project case and continues with an analysis of the the
city development project case. The identified interfa-
ces in the respective CLS triad are illustrated in Figure
2 for the hospital project and in Figure 3 for the city
development project. For the hospital project the dif-
ferent interfaces identified are marked with letters a–e
and for the city development with letters f–k.
In the case of the hospital project, the public devel-
oper started with acknowledging the challenging
logistics conditions, and from the beginning the inter-
action with the contractor was based on a transla-
tional interface (a) as the developer asked the
contractor to create a CLS based on the needs of the
developer. However, as the contractor could not
adhere to this and did not come up with a suitable
setup, the developer instead turned to the LSP regard-
ing the need for a CLS. The developer in the role of a
customer thus expressed certain demands in the form
of a translational interface (b) serving as input for the
development of a CLS by the LSP. Based on this, the
LSP translated the developer’s needs into a CLS based
on its standardised operations, as to benefit from util-
isation of already established routines and resources.
Consequently, the customer-supplier contract between
the developer and the contractor came to involve
‘only’ production, with a content of a specified inter-
face (c) regulating that the contractor had to use the
LSP and its services for logistics operations. However,
details regarding the content of the CLS was not part
of this interface. The LSP hence became the supplier
of logistics services to the contractor, that was forced
by the agreement with the developer to pay for the
CLS, and thus, it became the formal customer to
the LSP. The collaboration between the contractor and
the LSP is thus contingent on a standardised interface
(d) as the contractor had no ability to affect the serv-
ices provided. The interfaces between the contractor
and the subcontractors as well as between the con-
tractor/subcontractors and their respective materials
suppliers and transport providers are specified (e) as
the contractor ‘pass on’ the demands regarding the
use of the CLS to these actors, based on the require-
ments for using the CLS and their logistics operations.
In the city development project the public devel-
oper role exists on two levels. The public developer
had previous experiences of working with a specific
LSP from another development program. In the city
development program, they therefore initiated the
development of a CLS in an interactive interface (f),
taking into account both actors’ knowledge and
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conditions. In the role of the supplier of land, the pub-
lic developer conditioned land allocation to its cus-
tomers, the various private developers in different
projects, by specified interfaces (g) directing all devel-
opers to set demands on their suppliers (contractors)
to use the CLS. Consequently, specified interfaces (h)
between the private developers and the LSP arose, as
these developers partly paid for the CLS by land allo-
cation fees. The logistics requirements were in turn
forwarded to the contractors. Hence, also the interface
between private developers and contractors were
characterised as specified interfaces (i), as a direct con-
sequence of the interface between the public devel-
oper and the private developers. Each contractor had
the opportunity to buy additional logistics services,
besides the mandatory basic services, in the CLS pro-
vided by the LSP. Furthermore, contractors also called
for logistics services, for instance, intermediate storage
of concrete elements, that were not provided by the
LSP. Private developers did not pay for the direct util-
isation of the basic services, as the cost for the CLS
was covered partly by land agreements between the
public developer and private developers. Instead, pay-
ments for the utilisation of the CLS, including the
option for additional services, were covered by the
contractors who, by their customer-supplier interfaces
with private developers, were forced to adhere to the
CLS. The respective interface between contractors and
the LSP were thus characterised as standardised inter-
faces (j), as contractors in their roles as customers had
to buy the basic services from the LSP, based on the
public developer’s requirements enforced through the
private developer’s requirements. The interfaces
between the contractor and the subcontractors, as
well as between the contractor/subcontractors and
their respective materials suppliers and transport pro-
viders are specified (k) as the contractor ‘pass on’ the
demands regarding the use of the CLS to these actors.
Implications of interfaces for CLS triad actors
The implications of the interfaces on the actors
involved in the CLS triad are analysed below and sum-
marised in Table 3. The discussion of interfaces in the
previous section points to that the customer-supplier
roles in the two CLS triads are blurred with regard to
the relational interfaces between contractors, develop-
ers, and LSPs. The different interfaces create various
effects for the LSP depending on which type of inter-
face is established by the customer. The analysis
shows that the CLS is initiated by the public actor as
part of their developer role but operated by an LSP,
exemplified in interfaces (b) in the hospital project
and (f) in the city development project. However, it is
not the public developer that pays for the CLS and
when the actor initiating the CLS does not pay for the
setup, the cost is instead regulated in other interfaces.
In the hospital project, the contractor (and subcontrac-
tors) are the ones paying for the CLS, regulated in
interface (d). In the city development project, the cost
for the CLS is partly covered in interface (g) between
the public developer as a land owner and the other
developers involved in the development program, but
also in interface (j) between the contractors and the
subcontractors and the LSP. Consequently, in both
projects the contactors are forced to pay for the CLS
provided by the LSP and align with the CLS as a con-
sequence of the interface (c and i) with their custom-
ers. Hence, it is not a free choice of selection of LSP
(supplier) and consequently earlier experiences of per-
ceived benefits of other suppliers from the perspec-
tives of contractors cannot be taken into
consideration. As such, there is an intricate interplay
between the various interfaces in the CLS triad that
affects how the costs of the CLS are distributed
among the actors. Costs in this sense do not only
relate to ‘payments’ for the CLS but also for maintain-
ing the respective interface in relation to the CLS.
Furthermore, one aspect is the cost in relation to the
CLS that is visible in the tendering process, as in the
specified interface (g) in the city development project
based on the requirements in the land agreement,
and in the developer-contractor interface (i). In com-
parison, in the hospital project, the contractor is ten-
dered prior to the conditions for the CLS being set
(interface a), wherefore, associated CLS costs are not
part of the developer-contractor contract but appears
later on in the process. There is also the case of extra
costs because of how the CLS and the related stipu-
lated logistics conditions align with the contractors’
processes, where additional costs occurred as an extra
intermediate storage became necessary to secure con-
struction operations (hospital project) or fulfilling rules
of conduct (city development project).
Furthermore, the interfaces including the interplay
between them also provide effects in terms of how
they contribute (or not) to productivity and innovativ-
ity, for individual actors, but also in respect to total
project productivity and innovativity. As in the effects
of costs stemming from various interfaces, the analysis
shows a somehow uneven distribution of the effects
with regard to productivity where potential productiv-
ity gains sometimes are hampered by the fact that
conditions for the CLS are set after contractors have
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been tendered, as in the hospital project. This
decreases the contractors’ abilities to take the CLS
into consideration in their construction planning.
In the case with the interactive interface (f)
between the public developer and the LSP in the city
development project, the ambition revolved around
(1) the creation of on-site productivity of logistics and
(2) increased productivity for (non-construction
related) transport to reduce disturbances from con-
struction traffic. Hence, in both these cases the stand-
ardised interfaces (j) between the contractors and the
LSPs enhanced productivity on site with regard to
materials handling and construction production activ-
ities respectively. However, for the various contractors
on site it was difficult to make constructive use of this
enhanced productivity as this would require redistribu-
tion of resources in the form of personnel and/or
equipment to other sites or a different setup in terms
of planning for allocation of resources in the start of
the project. Also, in the hospital project, the standar-
dised interface (d) and how those demands are caus-
ing effects via interfaces (e), shows how the CLS
acquired was mainly approaching on-site logistics and
did not consider off-site effects. This resulted in
improved conditions for productivity on site but ham-
pered the productivity off-site among mater-
ial suppliers.
The interactive interface (f) between the public
developer and the LSP in the city development project
shows that when a supplier and an initiater jointly, in
interaction, develop the specifications of the CLS, tak-
ing into account both actors’ contexts, a CLS can be
created that copes with initiaters needs along with
efficient use of the suppliers’ resources. However, as
the initiator in this case was not the user of the CLS,
the users’ operational needs to increase productivity
were left out during the design process. The other
interfaces in that CLS triad are characterised by a
more limited freedom with regard to use of resources
for both customers and suppliers in the interfaces
between developer-LSP (h), developer-contractor (i)
and contractor-LSP (j) respectively.
Lastly, it should be highlighted that the CLS are ini-
tiated and designed primarily as to decrease distur-
bances in the construction processes and for third
parties and not to increase productivity, costs or
increase innovativity. Thus, the focus of the interfaces
(a and g) between the initiator (public developers)
and the LSP was to improve conditions for third party
actors in the public domain, i.e. in the hospital project
ambulances and other hospital operations, and in the
city development project inhabitants of the city.
Table 3 below comprises a compilation of the
effects due to the identified interfaces in the two
CLS triads.
Implications for the wider network
The features of the CLS mitigate through the CLS triad
as a result of the interface characteristics and the
interplay among various interfaces that, in turn,
impact on costs, productivity, and innovativity among
the actors of the construction project. This, in turn,
impact on other actors beyond the triad. Furthermore,
interfaces to actors outside the CLS triad affect the
CLS triad and the outcomes for those actors. This is
also evident in the cases where both CLS are initiated
due to a need to reduce disturbances on actors out-
side the CLS triad such as third parties in the form of
ambulances, health-care personnel, citizens, offices etc.
For example, in the city development project, the
responsibility of the public actor to provide for
reduced disturbances for third parties due to fewer
vehicles in the area is crucial. Thus, interfaces to those
actors outside the CLS triad have a severe impact on
the CLS.
However, the interfaces within the CLS triad also
impact on actors outside the triad in the supply chain.
In both projects, the interface between the contractor
and the LSP aiming for increased productivity on-site,
had effects for carriers and suppliers upstream the
supply chain since they had to adapt their standard
routines to the CLS. Demands regulated in the stand-
ardised interface between the contractor and the LSP
(d) were passed on via the interfaces (e) to subcontrac-
tors, materials suppliers and transporter providers,
thus generating additional costs for these actors. This
is no surprise as the design and operation of the CLS
are focussed on on-site conditions, with effects on
productivity on site, and not to improve productivity
in the total supply chain encompassing materials sup-
pliers and their operations. However, one exception is
the productivity regarding transport as it increases
when bundling of deliveries is applied. Hence, in the
hospital project actors upstream the supply chain act-
ing as suppliers to contractors with specified interfaces
(e), the standardised interface between the contractor
and the LSP (d) in relation to on-site conditions led to
adaptations beyond normal routines which decreased
their productivity making use of their resources. The
same logic applied for the subcontractors in both proj-
ects as they had to adapt to the CLS, and thereby act
as customers to the LSP by paying for its services, not
by choice but by conditions stipulated by the
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developer. Therefore, as a consequence of the ambi-
tion to cope with challenging logistics conditions on
the site and decrease disturbance on third-parties, the
interfaces in the CLS triad force other actors in the
wider network of the CLS triad to adapt to the CLS ini-
tiated by a public actor. Commonly, this clashes with
the established productivity logic and established rou-
tines of these private actors.
Furthermore, both cases show that previous interfa-
ces, prior to the projects under study, play a crucial
role. In the hospital project, previous interfaces to vari-
ous customers in the form of contractors and develop-
ers have enabled the LSP to provide for a
standardised CLS, that is central for their efficient use
of resources, and in turn, enables effects of increased
productivity in logistics operations on site as well as
reduced disturbances on third-parties. The LSP can
exploit the CLS to its fullest, as the developer has no
previous experience and thus has to rely on the skills
of the CLS without being able to specify demands but
leaves it up to the LSP to design and operate the CLS
via a translational interface. Also, in the city develop-
ment project, the previous interface between the pub-
lic developer and the LSP is crucial for the design of
the CLS. Thus, interface analysis of a particular proj-
ect’s CLS triad must take into consideration how inter-
faces relate over time, beyond the project boundary,
both prior to the CLS triad in focus, but also after, in
terms of learning and experiences gained in the CLS
triad that might affect how customers and suppliers
behave in future interfaces.
Discussion of theoretical contributions
As a response to Bastl et al. (2019) we have developed
the foundation for how service triads are organised
and managed, which should be seen as a theoretical
contribution. The unique aspect of the CLS, which has
not been covered in the research of transport service
triads (TST), is the forced customer role, a central aspect
in relation to the roles of customers and suppliers in
the CLS triad. The customer in the form of a contrac-
tor might be unwilling to access the resources of the
supplier (the LSP), but is despite that forced to pay
and use the services. This is a consequence of its role
as supplier to a developer that enforces the use of the
LSP. This forced customer role creates a resistance
from the enforced customer to support the CLS.
Hence, this paper shows that these initiatives are not
driven by an understanding of the need to improve
logistics. This is a contribution to the construction
logistics area, as this to some extent explains the lack
of comprehensive implementation of logistics and
SCM in construction (e.g. Vrijhoef and Koskela 2000,
Bankvall et al. 2010).
This leads us to our second theoretical contribution.
As a response to the critique presented by Selviaridis
and Spring (2007), we are explicating the mediating
roles and implications of indirect relationships inher-
ent in TPL situations. In previous studies of CLS (e.g.
Janne and Fredriksson 2019), we also identify two
types of customers to the same CLS. The first type of
customer, the public initiatiator, acts to improve the
common good with the goal to decrease the distur-
bances on third parties. However, the main objective
of the second type of customer, private contractors
and subcontractors, who are the users of and pay for
the services, is to improve costs, productivity and
innovativity in line with original intentions of the
framework by Araujo et al. (2016). Thus, findings show
a clash between the incentives and goals of public
actors with construction logistics, with the responsibil-
ity of reducing disturbances for third parties, and the
business models of private developers, contractors
and LSPs involved in the CLS triad. Therefore, to some
extent the demands set by public developers interfere
with the logics in these business models, and thus, a
new performance indicator, disturbances, was intro-
duced in the context of CLS. Thus, this application of
the Araujo et al. (2016) framework to a new context
contributes to its further development. The framework
has earlier been applied in industrial contexts with
very clear roles regarding the supplier-customer inter-
action and only private actors (e.g. Araujo et al. 2016,
Andersen and Gadde 2019, Sundquist and Melander
2020). Though, here we show that the performance
indicators are dependent on the context of the triad.
Li and Choi (2009) argue that a lack of understand-
ing of triadic relationships and their dynamics is essen-
tial to their implementation success. This paper shows
that the interfaces are dynamic and develop over
time. This is evident from the two studied cases where
the perceptions regarding the use of a CLS among the
contractors shifted from highly negative to slightly
positive during the project. This can be regarded as
business opportunities as the actors learn over time
and can adapt their resource base in a way that
enable them to cope with future similar situations in a
way that is less negative for them. However, the com-
mon temporariness of the relationships in construction
projects is identified as a hinder for such develop-
ment. In line with previous studies, applying the inter-
face framework identify great potential in high
involvement interfaces as long term relational
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investments (Araujo et al. 1999, Andersen and Gadde
2019), the features of the construction industry with
strong reliance on competitive tendering and focus on
individual projects, affect the possibilities of exploit-
ation of interfaces as investment.
A third theoretical contribution relates to the CLS
research stream and highlights the importance to ana-
lyse CLS as a triad in a wider business network
(Eriksson, 2019). One important aspect regarding the
various consequences concerning costs, productivity
and/or innovativity is the fact that the applied inter-
face among customer-supplier is heavily embedded in
several other interfaces: thus, it affects other actors in
the network. An interface might enhance productivity
in a certain part of the supply chain, for example on
the construction site, while it hampers productivity
more up-stream the supply chain. Innovation is also
affected. For example, by specifying a CLS very strictly
in individual projects, innovative setups might be hin-
dered as the involved actors cannot develop and com-
bine its resource collections into new solutions.
Furthermore, the focus of the public initiators to
decrease disturbances on third parties, removes focus
from how the CLS impacts the actors in the construc-
tion project and supply chain. Hence, each actor’s per-
spective is limited by its network horizon (Holmen and
Pedersen 2003, Eriksson et al. 2020) but even if the
network horizon is rather wide it can be very hard to
interpret the perspectives of other actors and foresee
certain effects from these actors’ perspectives.
Each actor also has a unique perspective on what is
a suitable CLS for each specific context depending on
what type of role the actor has, i.e. contractor, LSP,
developer, supplier, or customer. The exchange of
such perspectives can be promoted by early interac-
tions among the actors in the CLS triad. Consequently,
the selection of one interface should be the outcome
of decisions that take into account not only the con-
tent of the interface among supplier and customer,
but the wider picture of how other actors are affected,
both within and beyond the focal CLS triad. Benefits
perceived by the initiator of the CLS must be balanced
against the investments that have to be made among
the many actors who have to align to the CLS. In
order to get acceptance for such a CLS it is therefore
important that a discussion of the distribution of costs
is held early in the process and that this is accepted
by all parties in the CLS triad. Reaching this consensus
early on means that it will also be easier for each of
the three parties in the CLS triad to forward the mes-
sage in their respective part of the wider network.
Conclusions
The purpose of the paper is to advance the under-
standing of the design and use of CLS and the distri-
bution of various outcomes of such arrangement on
the actors involved. In the forthcoming two sections
we articulate the theoretical and managerial contribu-
tions of the paper.
Theoretical contributions
In line with the discussions on the theoretical contri-
butions the paper contributes to (1) the construction
logistics literature and (2) the framework originally
developed by Araujo et al. (1999) and how it can be
used (and developed) in a triadic setting depending
on context. To the construction logistics research we
contribute by highlighting the need to analyse the
CLS from a triadic perspective and as embedded in a
wider network to explain the implementation resist-
ance of the CLS. Second, when a public actor is the
initiator of the CLS, the initiator role and the user role
need to be separated in the CLS triad. The paper
shows that the framework by Araujo et al. (1999) is
very suitable for analysing a CLS in a triadic setting.
However, the performance indicators need to be
adapted to the context. This is illustrated in the paper
through the introduction of the disturbances perform-
ance indicator, stemming from the public
actor initiative.
Managerial contributions
The forced customer role in CLS as a result of the CLS
being initiated by a public actor shows that for con-
tractors it is important to be able to adapt the
resource base and interaction in various interfaces
based on different types of CLS. To decrease the cost
of CLS and increase the innovativeness of the imple-
mentation, the contractors need to develop strategies
of how to combine internal resource bases with
resources of various other actors and CLS. For public
actors initiating CLS, on the other hand, it is important
to increase their understanding of how the demands
of a certain CLS affect other actors. As a general
guideline, they need to elaborate on their goal of
decreasing disturbances in relation to the contractors’
goals of productivity. Public actors can through poli-
cies regarding the use of CLS in public development
project help to enhance the advancement of product-
ivity and innovativity in the construction industry.
However, considerations need to be taken with regard
to the potential negative effects in terms of uneven
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distribution of costs and gains, which might cause
resistance to use CLS. In conclusion, interaction in
early stages with possibilities to influence the CLS is a
key aspect for all actors, affecting the ability to design
the CLS to exploit and develop internal resource bases
in interaction with other actors’ resources. A key
achievement for the LSP is also to cope with the
forced customers and to manage the interaction with
those actors as to provide for a smooth process in the
combining of various resources.
Future research
The paper is based on examples where public actors
play a significant role in the organising of construction
logistics and hence, the outcomes for various actors.
More studies are required to advance the understand-
ing of this role in relation to various contextual fac-
tors, distribution of outcomes, and connections over
time across various projects. Thus, despite the generic
role in the form of of the public developer, the behav-
iour, intentions and effects are by no means generic,
wherefore more studies could add to the multifaceted
role public actors play.
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